Consensus Reaching in Social Network Group Decision Making: Research Paradigms and Challenges by Dong, Yucheng et al.
1 
Consensus Reaching in Social Network Group Decision 
Making: Research Paradigms and Challenges1 
Yucheng Donga, Quanbo Zhaa, Hengjie Zhangb, Gang Kouc, Hamido Fujitad, Francisco Chiclanae, Enrique 
Herrera-Viedma f,g
a Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China 
b Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China 
c School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China 
d Faculty of Software and Information Science, Iwate Prefectural University, Iwate, Japan  
e Centre for Computational Intelligence, Faculty of Technology, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK 
f Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, University of Granada, Granada 18071, Spain  
g Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah 
21589, Saudi Arabia  
Abstract: In social network group decision making (SNGDM), the consensus reaching 
process (CRP) is used to help decision makers with social relationships reach consensus. Many 
CRP studies have been conducted in SNGDM until now. This paper provides a review of CRPs in 
SNGDM, and as a result it classifies them into two paradigms: (i) the CRP paradigm based on 
trust relationships, and (ii) the CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution. Furthermore, identified 
research challenges are put forward to advance this area of research.  
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1. Introduction
Group decision making (GDM) consists of a group of decision makers who express their 
opinions on a set of alternatives with the aim of choosing the best alternative [1,2]. Traditionally, 
GDM models focus on two processes: the consensus reaching process (CRP) and the selection 
process. In a CRP, decision makers might need to modify their opinions, making them more 
similar or closer, in order to increase the consensus level of the group. This is considered an 
iterative and dynamic process leading to the final group consensus based solution after multiple 
rounds of discussions and modifications [3,4,5]. Complete consensus state is not necessary in 
general and, as a consequence, soft consensus approaches are often employed in CRPs. As 
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mentioned above, when consensus among decision makers is reached, a selection process is 
applied usually by fusing the preferences of individual decision makers into a collective 
preference from which the final ordering of the considered alternatives is derived [6,7]. 
With the development of information and network technology, a new type of social network 
group decision making (SNGDM) problems has to be faced today. On the one hand, a social 
network allows information exchange and communication, and, therefore, provides social 
relationships among the decision makers [8,9,10]. During their interactions, decision makers with 
more experience and knowledge may influence other decision makers in the social network. On 
the other hand, opinion evolution, also called opinion dynamics, describes the process of forming 
opinions among a group of interactive decision makers [11-21]. Generally, in opinion evolution a 
decision maker would take into account other decision makers' opinions to form or evolve their 
own opinions. In a repeated process of interacting, the decision makers will update their opinions, 
which can lead to a consensus, fragmentation or polarization. 
Usually, a consensus based solution in GDM is needed, which increases the satisfaction of 
decision makers as their opinions are reconsidered to reach an acceptable consensus level in the 
corresponding CRP. However, in some situation, trust relationships defined by a social network, 
play a key element in GDM and, as a consequence, consensus models in SNGDM is becoming a 
hot research topic. To date, many studies have been conducted on consensus in SNGDM, with a 
recent literature review in SNGDM provided by Herrera-Viedma et al. [140]. However, it is noted 
that this review does not analyze the CRP paradigms in SNGDM as mentioned above: (1) the CRP 
paradigm based on trust relationships, and (2) the CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution. This 
paper aims at filling this literature review gap and will analyze the research challenges to address 
in future to advance this topic. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic knowledge regarding the 
general framework of CRPs and social network analysis for GDM is introduced. The CRP 
paradigm based on trust relationships is introduced in Section 3, while the CRP paradigm based on 
opinion evolution is analyzed in Section 4. The research challenges in SNGDM are presented in 




In this section, we introduce some basic knowledge regarding the general framework of 
CRPs and social network analysis for GDM.  
2.1 General CRP 
In a CRP, a group of decision makers, 1 2{ , , , }mD d d d  , express their preferences over 
several alternatives 1 2{ , , , }nX x x x  , and try to achieve a consensus based solution. The 
















Fig.1. The general framework of a CRP 
(1) Preference representation 
A preference representation structure is utilized to represent the opinions of decision makers. 
Decision makers' preferences on a set of alternatives X can be represented in different ways using 
distinct preference representation structures, such as: utility values [22]; preference orderings 
[23,24]; additive preference relations [25-27]; linguistic preferences [28-32]; multiple attribute 
preferences [33,34]; and heterogeneous preference representation structures [35-39]. The additive 
preference relation (also called fuzzy preference relation) is one of the most widely used 
preference presentation structures. The additive preference relation of decision maker kd  is 
usually represented in matrix form ( )k kij n nP p  , where [0,1]
k
ijp   denotes his/her preference 
degree on the alternative ix  over the alternative jx , with 1
k k
ij jip p   (for all i, j). Generally, 
the choice of a particular preference representation structure will not change the basic 
methodology applied during a CRP. Without loss of generality, the additive preference relation 




An aggregation operator, f , is utilized to aggregate the individual preferences into a 
collective one, ( )c cij n nP p  , as follows: 
1 2( , , , )c mij ij ij ijp f p p p                              (1) 








Many different aggregation operators (e.g., weighted average (WA), ordered weighted 
average (OWA), and importance induced ordered weighted average (I-IOWA)) [40,41] have been 
developed and therefore are possible to be used in the aggregation step of a CRP.  
(3) Consensus measure 
A consensus measure is a function that measures the similarity degree among decision 
makers, which is based on the use of a distance function [42,43], in one of the two following 
ways:  
(a) Consensus measure based on distances to the collective preference. The collective 
preference represents the opinion of the group, and consensus at this level is calculated by 
measuring the distances between each individual preference relation and the aggregated collective 
preference relation.   
(b) Consensus measure based on pairwise distances between decision makers. Consensus at 
this level is calculated by measuring the distances between each pair of individual preference 
relations.  
(4) Feedback mechanism  
A feedback mechanism aims to support decision makers in increasing the group consensus. It 
is often based on two kinds of consensus rules: 
(a) Identification rule (IR) and direction rule (DR) [44,45]. The first one is used to identify 
the decision makers who contribute less to consensus, whom are requested to modify their 
preferences, while the second one is generated to support the identified decision makers on the 
direction of change of their preferences, which invariably means to go in the direction of getting 
closer to the collective preference or the preferences of the most trusted/influential/important 
decision maker(s) within the group.  
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(b) Optimization-based consensus rule [46-50], which are utilized to minimize the number of 
adjusted decision makers, alternatives, preference values, and distance between the original and 
adjusted preferences. The optimal adjusted preferences generated from optimization-based 
consensus rules are often used as the target values for decision makers to modify their preferences.  
(5) Selection 
When a predefined consensus threshold value among the group of decision makers is 
achieved, a selection process is applied to derive a final consensus ranking (from best to worst) of 
the alternatives. Because there are different preference representation structures available to be 
used in a decision making problem, different selection approaches are also available. In particular, 
when dealing with additive preference relations, an approach based on dominance and 
non-dominance degrees of alternatives is often adopted [51,52]. 
Table 1. CRPs with different design of key elements 
References  Preference structures Consensus measure Feedback mechanism 
Ben-Arieh et al. [46]; 
Zhang et al. [49]; 
Gong et al. [54] 
Utility values 
Based on distances to the 
collective preference 
Optimization-based 
 consensus rule 
 Guha et al. [55]; 
Wu et al. [56]; 
Parreiras et al. [57] 
Multiple attribute 
preference  
Based on distances 
between experts 
IR and DR based 
consensus rule 
Dong et al. [34]; 
Zhang et al. [58] 
Kim et al. [59]; 
Multiple attribute 
preference  
Based on distances to the 
collective preference 
IR and DR based 
consensus rule 
Dong et al. [60];  
Palomares et al. [61]; 
Kacprzyk et al. [62]; 
Pérez et al. [63]; 
Quesada et al. [64]; 
Additive preference 
relations  
Based on distances 
between experts 
IR and DR based 
consensus rule 
Alonso et al. [9]; 
Herrera-Viedma et al. [45]; 
Zhang et al. [65]; 
Cabrerizo et al. [66]; 
Mata et al. [67] 
Linguistic preference 
relations 
Based on distances 
between experts 
IR and DR based 
consensus rule 
Dong et al. [34,37]; 
Herrera-Viedma et al. [39]; 
Zhang et al. [68]; 
Choudhury et al. [69] 
Heterogeneous 
preference 
representation structure  
Based on distances to the 
collective preference 
IR and DR based 
consensus rule 
Considering different combinations of the key elements of a CRP, a number of CRPs have 
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been developed, with some references to publications where they have been reported given in 
Table 1. 
2.2 Social network analysis for GDM 
A social network is a platform where users disseminate information and communicate with 
each other, which in turn can be used to study relationships among users using what is known as 
social network analysis. Social network analysis has been widely studied in different fields, such 
as group decision making [73,74], multiagent systems [53,141] and so on. In this section, we 
mainly introduce the basic knowledge of social network analysis in GDM. 
In SNGDM, a social network is essentially represented as a graph ( , )G D E , with nodes 
representing decision makers 1 2{ , , , }mD d d d   and edges E  corresponding the social 
relationships between decision makers. Concepts in social network analysis in GDM are formally 
described below as Definitions 1-4 [70,83].  
Definition 1. A social network is defined by a directed graph ( , )G D E , where 
1 2{ , , , }mD d d d   is the set of decision makers, E  is a set of ordered pair of elements of D  
and edge ( , )i jd d E  defines that decision maker id  directly trusts decision maker jd .  
Definition 2. An adjacent matrix ( )ij m mA a   is used to describe ( , )G D E , where  
1,  ( , )








,                           (2) 
thus 1ija   denotes decision maker id  directly trust jd . 
An adjacent matrix as per Definition 2 can only describe whether trust relationship between 
each pair of decision makers exists or not, with trust strengths among decision makers are not 
permitted. To overcome this issue, a weighted adjacent matrix is proposed. For notation simplicity, 
we still use ( )ij m mA a   to denote a weighted adjacent matrix. In a weighted adjacent matrix 
( )ij m mA a  , [0,1]ija   
denotes the trust strength from decision maker id  to decision maker 
jd , with the larger the value of ija  
the higher the trust decision maker id  has on decision maker 
jd . An example of a weighted adjacent matrix, associated with the directed social network 
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Fig.2. A weighted directed graph 
For notation simplicity, adjacent matrix and weighted adjacent matrix are both called 
adjacent matrix in this paper. 
Definition 3. A sequence of edges 
1 1 2 1
( , )( , ) ( , )
ni i i i i j
d d d d d d

  in a social network ( , )G D E  
is called a trust path from decision maker id  to decision maker jd , and it is denoted as 
i jd d . 











                            (3) 
The in-degree centrality index of a decision maker in a social network ( , )G D E  reflects the 
importance degree of this decision maker in the social network [71]. In general, the higher the 
value of the in-degree centrality index of a decision maker the higher the importance of such 
decision maker in the social network is, and therefore it is used to compute the weighting vector 
associated to a group of decision makers in SNGDM models (see Section 3.2). For example, if we 
set 15 0.8a   and 45 0.6a   in Fig.2, then the in-degree centrality index of decision maker 5d  
can be computed by 5 15 45( ) ( ) / 4 0.35C d a a   . 
3. CRP paradigm based on trust relationships in SNGDM 
In this section, we introduce the CRP paradigm based on trust relationships in SNGDM. 
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Specifically, Section 3.1 presents the framework of a CRP paradigm based on trust relationships, 
Section 3.2 introduces the trust propagation, and Sections 3.3-3.5 review the main results 
regarding the use of trust relationships in different phases of a CRP. 
3.1 The framework of CRP paradigm based on trust relationships 
In recent years, the trust relationships among decision makers, described by a social network, 
are increasingly playing a key role in different phases of CRPs in the SNGDM problem: 
aggregation [9,75,80,82], incomplete preference values estimation [74,75,77], and feedback 
mechanism [8,76,79,83]. In the existing research proposals, many CRPs have been studied based 
on the use of trust relationships, and as such they can be classified as following the CRP paradigm 
based on the use of trust relationships as depicted in Fig.3. 
 
Fig.3. The CRP paradigm based on trust relationships 
3.2 Trust propagation 
In some situation, a decision maker may not provide trust values on every decision maker, 
which is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) with no direct trust from decision maker 1d  to decision maker 
3d . However, some approaches have been developed to estimate the missing trust values in a 
social network. For example, Victor et al. [72] and Wu et al. [8,73] proposed to apply a t-norm 
operator to the trust values in the trust path 1 2 2 3( )( )d d d d  to estimate the trust value from 
decision maker 1d  to decision maker 3d  (see Fig. 4(b)).    
In many cases, there might be more than one trust path available between two decision 
makers. For example, in Fig. 2 there are three trust paths from decision maker 1d  to decision 
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maker 3d : (1) 1 2 2 3( , )( , )d d d d , (2) 1 5 5 3( , )( , )d d d d , and (3) 1 4 4 5 5 3( , )( , )( , )d d d d d d . Several 
approaches have been proposed to deal with this situation. Table 2 summarizes the approaches to 
estimating unknown trust values in a social network. 
                    
(a) No direct trust between 1d  and 3d     
    (b) Trust propagation between 1d  and 3d  via 2d  
Fig. 4. Trust propagation via a trust path 
Table 2. Approaches of estimating unknown trust value 
Methods 
One or more 
trust paths 
References Basic idea 
The t-norm 
method 
One trust path 
Victor et al. [72];  
Wu et al. [8,73] 
The unknown trust value is calculated based on the 
t-norm. 
Product method One trust path 
Liang et al. [74]; 
Wu et al. [75] 
The unknown trust value is computed as the product of 
the trust values in the trust path. 
Minimum rule  One trust path Gupta [76] 
The unknown trust value is regarded as the minimal 




One trust path Xu et al. [77] 
The unknown trust value is calculated based on the 





Wu et al. [75] 
The unknown trust value is computed by aggregating the 





Wu et al. [8,73] 
The unknown trust value is regarded as the estimated 
trust value corresponding to the shortest trust path. 
Maximum rule  
Multiple trust 
paths 
Liang et al. [74]; 
Gupta [76] 
The unknown trust value is regarded as the maximum 
estimated trust value among the trust paths. 
Generally, in many CRPs with trust relationships, unknown trust values are estimated first. 
However, it is noted that there exist some studies (see [9,78-81]) that develop CRPs based on trust 
relationships with unknown trust values. 
3.3 Preferences aggregation driven by trust relationships  
As described in Section 2.1, the individual preferences are fused to obtain a collective 
preference, which requires the application of an aggregation operator with a weighting vector 
associated to the set of decision makers as its key element. Generally, decision makers' weights are 
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assumed known beforehand. However, such assumption is unrealistic or improbable in some 
circumstance. In a social network, decision makers with more importance are often trusted more 
by other decision makers, which indicates that their weights can be considered higher in SNGDM. 
Some methods have been proposed to obtain the weights of decision makers from the trust 
relationships, as mentioned before in Section 2.2, which are subsequently implemented in the 
preference fusion process.  
Indeed, in [9,75,80,82] a WA operator is used to aggregate the individual preferences with 
weights computed from the trust relationships, while in [8,40,78,81,83] the I-IOWA operator is 
utilized to fuse the individual preferences, with importance weights derived from the concept of 
social influence. Liang et al. [74] proposed a linear programming model to determine the 
collective preference with weights derived from trust relationships among decision makers. 
 
Fig.5. Preferences aggregation driven by trust relationships 
Compared with traditional CRPs, the novel CRPs use the techniques of social network 
analysis to compute decision makers' weights which are subsequently implemented in the 
aggregation process as per Eq.(1). In SNGDM the preferences aggregation driven by trust 
relationships is described in Fig.5 and includes a two-step procedure: 
(1) Computing relative importance degree. As mentioned before, the in-degree centrality 
index can be interpreted as a measurement of the importance of decision makers in a social 












                           
    (4) 
(2) Aggregating the preferences of decision makers. In this phase, the individual preferences 
of decision makers are aggregated into a collective one, cijp , by using an aggregation operator 




1 2( , , , )c mij ij ij ijp f p p p                             (5) 
Preferences aggregation driven by trust relationships obtains the weighting vector from the 
measurement of the importance of decision makers in a social network, which provides with a 
more solid theoretical foundation and basis for their validity by comparison with the above 
assumption of being known beforehand.   
3.4 Incomplete preference values estimation based on trust relationships 
Sometimes, due to limited expertise, domain complexity or pressure in making a decision, a 
decision maker would find it difficult or even impossible to provide assessment on every 
alternative. This leads to incomplete preferences, for which various approaches/methods have 
been proposed (e.g., [84-87]) to complete them by estimating the unknown/missing values. It is 
reasonable to expect that the more one person trusts another, the more this person will agree with 
his/her preference. Thus, incomplete preference values of a decision maker in SNGDM are 
estimated based on the preferences provided by other decision makers he/she trusts using trust 
relationships-based methods. 
Trust values reflect the importance of decision makers' preferences in the incomplete 
preference values estimation [75]. The missing preference values are estimated using the 
preference of the decision maker most trusted by the decision maker who provides the incomplete 
preference [77]. In order to improve the consistency degree, Liang et al. [74] proposed a linear 
programming method with two objectives: to minimize the distance between the estimated 
preference and the expert supporters' weighted preferences and to maximize the consistency 
degree. 
 
Fig.6. Incomplete preference values estimation based on trust relationships 
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According to the SNGDM models, the incomplete preference values estimation is carried out 
in a two-step procedure presented in Fig.6: 
(1) Generating the decision makers' relative trust values from trust relationships. The relative 













                             (6) 
If both decision makers kd  and ld  express incomplete preferences, then 0kla   in 
estimating the unknown value of decision maker kd . In some models, the maximum method is 
applied to determine the relative trust values [77], i.e., if decision maker kd  assigns the highest 
trust value to decision maker ld , then 1kl  , and 0ki   for i l . 
(2) Estimating the unknown values based on the relative trust values. The incomplete 
preference value of decision maker kd , 
k
ijp , can be estimated based on the rest decision makers' 
preferences by an aggregation process with weighting vector 1 , 1 , 1( , , , , , )k k k k k km        : 
1 1 1( , , , , , )k k k mij ij ij ij ijp f p p p p
                          (7) 
In summary, incomplete preference values estimation based on trust relationships estimates 
the unknown/missing values of a decision maker from the preferences of other decision makers 
he/she trusts, which is convenient and reasonable. However, the estimation accuracy is closely 
related to the degree of agreement of their preferences. When the preference of a decision maker is 
quite different from those he/she trusts, the estimation error is likely to be large and the individual 
consistency will be ignored to some extent. 
3.5 Feedback mechanism guided by trust relationships 
In traditional CRPs, decision makers contributing less to consensus are advised to modify 
their opinions to values closer to the collective preference in an attempt to increase the group 
consensus level. Considering trust relationships among decision makers, the advice may be more 
acceptable for the decision maker if it is coming from other decision makers he/she trusts. 
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Following this idea, some feedback mechanisms guided by trust relationships are developed in 
SNGDM [8,74,76,79,83]. If a decision maker kd  
is an identified expert who is advised to revise 
his/her preference value, ,k tijp  , for assessing the pair of alternatives ( , )i jx x  at consensus round 
t , the feedback process guided by trust relationships is structured as shown in Fig.7 and applied as 
follows:  
 
Fig.7. The feedback mechanism guided by trust relationships 
(1) Advise decision maker kd  to modify his/her preference value closer to the preference 
value of decision maker ld  with minimum preference similarity with kd  [74]. The following 
cases are considered. 
Case A: If decision maker kd  directly trust decision maker ld , the new preference value, 
, 1k t
ijp
 , presented to decision maker kd  is inferred as: 
, 1 , ,(1 )k t k t l tij kl ij kl ijp a p a p
                             (8) 
Case B: If decision maker kd  do not directly trust decision maker ld , kd  will judge the 
social influence of ld  
to form his new preference value. Let 1 2{ , , , }m    be the set of 
relative importance degrees of decision makers as described before. Then, the next round 
preference value presented to decision maker kd  can be inferred as:  
, 1 , ,(1 )k t k t l tl lij ij ij
l k l k
p p p
 
   
   
 
                    (9) 
(2) Advise decision maker kd  
to modify his/her preference value closer to the preference 




, 1 , ,(1 )k t k t l tij ij ijp p p 
                              (10) 
where [0,1]   is a parameter to control the degree of advice. 
(3) Advise decision maker kd  to modify his/her preference value closer to the collective 
preference value of the decision makers he/she trusts [79]. Assume that there are r  decision 
makers trusted by decision maker kd  with 
,rc t
ijp  being their collective preference value at round 
t . The next round preference value presented to decision maker kd  will be: 
, 1 , ,(1 )k t k t rc tij ij ijp p p 
                              (11) 
where 1 2( , , )k k kr    is used as the weighting vector in an aggregation operator to compute 
,rc t
ijp  and [0,1]   is a parameter to control the degree of advice. 
(4) Advise decision maker kd  
to modify his preference value closer to the collective 
preference value ,c tijp : 
, 1 , ,(1 )k t k t c tij ij ijp p p 
   
                        
(12) 
where the collective preference, ,c tijp , is computed using trust relationships based weights as 
proposed in Wu et al. [8], while the parameter [0,1]   is inferred from the trust relationships 
among the decision makers as proposed in Gupta [76]. 
Feedback mechanism guided by trust relationships includes several methods on providing 
advice, and its relies on the fundamental assumption of advice for a decision maker that comes 
from trusted decision makers would be more persuasive and acceptable. Evidently, this type of 
feedback mechanism guided by trust relationships is more realistic than the traditional feedback 
mechanism. 
Notably, in Eqs.(10)-(12), the parameters (e.g.  ,   and  ) are used to control the degree 
of advice, and they can be controlled to attenuate the extent of the change required to increase the 
group consensus. The higher the value of such parameters, the closer the decision maker's 
modified preference will be to the preference value of reference derived from the trusted experts' 
preference values. The actual parameter values to implement are inferred from the trust 
relationships [74,76] or selected to minimize the distance between the original preference value 
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and the new one that will meet the consensus threshold set in advance by the group of experts 
[83]. 
4. CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution in SNGDM  
In this section, we review the CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution in SNGDM. 
Specifically, Section 4.1 introduces the framework of CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution, 
Section 4.2 introduces the opinion evolution and stable opinions, and Section 4.3 reviews the 
opinion management strategies for achieving a consensus. 
4.1 The framework of CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution 
Dating back to 1956, French and John [139] first proposed the basic model of opinion 
evolution. Since then, opinion evolution models with different evolution rules have emerged, such 
as the DeGroot model [12,13], Friedkin and Johnsen model [10,11], and bounded confidence 
model [14,103], among others. Although opinion evolution has been widely studied, we argue that 
the CRP based on opinion evolution in SNGDM is still at its early stage. 
In the CRP paradigm based on trust relationships covered in Section 3, there exists a 
moderator in the models to guide the change of opinions that derive from the application of the IR 
and DR rules. However, in reality decision makers' opinions will evolve due to their interaction in 
a social network. By taking the opinion evolution into account, opinion evolution based consensus 
models have been developed that differ on the evolution rules they implement [14,15,70]. The 
framework of the CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution in SNGDM is depicted in Fig. 8, and 
consists of six key elements: (1) preference representation, (2) social network, (3) opinion 
evolution, (4) stable opinions, (5) opinion management, and (6) selection. Among these elements, 
(1), (2) and (6) coincide with those described in Section 2, so we proceed to describe the other 
three in the following. 
(a) Opinion evolution. In a social network there exist lots of interactions among decision 
makers and as a result the opinions of decision makers evolve, which has been widely studied in 
the discipline of opinion evolution (see Section 4.2). 
(b) Stable opinions. After several rounds of opinion evolution, the opinions of decision 
makers will form a stable structure: consensus, polarization, or fragmentation [14,15]. If the 
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opinions are equal in the stable state, then a consensus is reached. On the other hand, when two or 
more different opinions exist in the stable state, they indicate polarization and fragmentation, 
respectively. 
(c) Opinion management. When the stable opinions are not in a consensus state, opinion 
management [15,88,89] is used to facilitate consensus, which is described in detail in Section 4.3. 
 
Fig.8. The CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution 
4.2 Opinion evolution and stable opinions 
In opinion evolution, each decision maker will take into account the opinions of other 
decision makers. However, they neither simply share nor strictly disregard the opinions of others. 
Generally, they refer to the opinions of others to a certain extent and modify their own opinions. 
The opinion evolution process can be formulated as a dynamical process in discrete time, where 
consensus, polarization, or fragmentation happens in the stable state. A recent survey on opinion 
evolution can be found in Dong et al. [15]. 
Let ,k tp  be the preference value of decision maker kd  
at round t . Let klw  be the weight 





 . Then, 
the opinion evolution process is formulated as follows: 
, 1 1, 2, ,
1 2  , 0,1,2,
k t t t m t
k k kmp w p w p w p t
                     (13) 
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or equivalently as: 
1 , 0,1,2,t tP W P t                          (14) 
where ( )ij m mW w   and 
1, 2, ,( , , , )t t t m t TP p p p  . 
On the one hand, the decision makers will form a consensus if ,lim ( 1,2, , )i t
t
p c i m

    for 
any 0 nP R , where c  is called the consensus opinion [14,70]. On the other hand, if there are 
two or more different opinions at the final stage, then we have a polarization or fragmentation in 
opinion evolution, respectively. Several opinion evolution models are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Some opinion evolution models 
Opinion evolution models Basic idea References 
DeGroot model The weights do not change across the 
time or with opinions. 
Degroot [12]; Berger [13]; Dong et al. 
[70]; Han et al. [90]; Lehere [91-93] 
Friedkin and Johnsen 
model 
The weights are independent on time, 
but everyone adheres to his initial 
opinion to a certain degree. 




The weights depend on opinions. Hegselmann et al. [14]; Dittmer [95]; 
Deffuant [96]; AskariSichani et al. [97]; 
Kurmyshev et al. [98]; Stauffer et al. 
[99]; Weisbuch [100]; Jalili [101]; 
Quattrociocchi et al [102]; Deffuant et al 
[103]; Fortunato [104]; Zollman [105] 
Time-variant model The weights are dependent on time. Hegselmann et al. [14]; Cohen et al. 
[106] 
Voter model A decision maker updates his/her 
opinion based on a randomly selected 
neighbor. 
Frachebourg et al. [107]; Schneider- 
Mizell et al. [108]; Holley et al. [109]; 
Basu et al. [110]; Castellano et al. [111]; 
Castellano et al. [112]; Sood et al. [113]; 
Diakonova et al. [114] 
Majority rule model The decision makers are randomly 
divided into several groups and the 
majority opinion will be voted as the 
representative of the group. 
Chen et al. [115]; Lambiotte [116]; 
Lanchier et al. [117] 
Sznajd model A decision maker is easier to be 
persuaded by two or more decision 
makers who share the same opinion 
than by a single decision maker. 
Stauffer et al. [118]; Rodrigues et al. 
[119]; Elgazzar [120]; Bernardes et al. 
[121] 
The trust relationships among decision makers in social network, as previously covered, play 
a particular key role in opinion evolution. Thus, opinion evolution is often studied in a social 
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network context [90,94]. The DeGroot model [12-14] is considered the “classical” model and it is 
widely used in opinion evolution. In the following we introduce DeGroot model in a social 
network context (see Dong et al. [70]), with the other opinion evolution models being similarly 
analyzed. 
Let ( )ij m mA a   be the adjacent matrix associated with ( , )G D E  as described before. 
Suppose that the decision maker kd  gives the trust value (0,1)k   to his own opinion and 
assigns (1 )k  to others' opinions. Then, the weight klw  decision maker kd  assigns to 
decision maker ld  














                             (15) 
Let , [0,1]k tp   be the preference value of decision maker kd  at round t . Thus, the 
opinion evolution of decision maker kd  is represented as [70]:  
 , 1 , ,
1,
m
k t k t l t
k kl
l l k
p p w p
 
                          (16) 
Eq. (16) can also be written as: 
1 * , 0,1,2,t tP W P t                           (17) 






















   

                       (18) 
and 1, 2, ,( , , , )t t t m t TP p p p  . 
Because the weights are fixed, Eq.(16) and Eq.(17) are regarded as the DeGroot model, 
which we call the social network DeGroot (SNDG) model in this paper. Dong et al. in [70] 
proposed and proved a consensus condition of the SNDG, which are given in Definition 5 and 
Theorem 1, respectively. 
Definition 5 [70]. In ( , )G D E , opinion leader is defined as the decision maker(s) in the set 
{ | ,  for all / { }}leaderG k i k i kD d d d d D d   , and follower is defined as the decision maker(s) in 
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the set { | }follower leaderG k k GD d d D  . 
Example: In Fig. 9(a), there exist trust paths from the other two decision makers to decision 
maker 2d  and decision maker 3d , respectively, which means that 2 3{ , }
leader
GD d d ; however in 
Fig. 9(b), no one is a leader, i.e., leaderGD  . 
                 
(a)                                     (b) 
Fig.9. The opinion leaders in a social network  
Theorem 1 [70]. All decision makers in the social network ( , )G D E  can form a consensus 
under the condition that the set of opinion leaders is nonempty, i.e., leaderGD   , and the 

















4.3 Opinion management 
The decision makers' opinions will be stable after a few rounds of opinion evolution, 
although consensus might not be the final outcome. In this case, an opinion management strategy 
is needed to help decision makers reach consensus. The following several approaches to manage 
opinions have been developed in the existent references (see Table 4): changing network structure, 
adjusting opinions, the use of informed decision makers, and the use of media. 
In the SNDG model, all the decision makers cannot form a consensus at the social network 
( , )G D E  when leaderGD   . In Dong et al. [70], an optimization-based model is proposed to 
add the minimum number of edges to create a new social network ( , )G D E  with leaderGD    
and E E : 













                           (19) 
In order to solve model (19), a two-step procedure (see Fig. 10) is needed: 
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Table 4. Some approaches of opinion management 
Opinion management Basic idea References 
Changing network 
structure 
Adding edges or nodes into the network to 
influence the opinion evolution. 
Dong et al. [70]; Hegselmann et al. 
[89]; Han et al. [90]; Han et al. 
[122]; Han et al. [123] 
Adjusting opinions To persuade the decision makers to modify their 
opinions toward the desired direction. 
Kurz [124]; Ding et al. [125] 
Informed decision 
makers 
Informed decision makers pretend to have an 
opinion similar to others with the purpose that 
gradually influence the opinions of others to a 
desired direction. 
AskariSichani et al. [97]; Afshar et 
al. [126]; Fan et al. [127]; 
Media To influence decision makers' opinions through 
the media, so as to achieve the purpose of opinion 
management. 
Mckeown et al. [88]; Quattrociocchi 
et al. [102]; Crokidakis [128]; Wu et 
al. [129]; Pineda et al. [130]; 
Colaiori et al. [131]; Schulze [132];  
 
Fig.10. Framework of adding edges 
(1) Social network partition. A Network Partition Algorithm [70] with the time complexity 
3( )O m  is proposed to divide ( , )G D E  into a partition 1 1 1{ ( , ), , ( , )}l l lM G D E G D E   whose 








  . It guarantees that all decision makers in ( , )G D E  are 
assigned to its sub-networks. 




D   . It means that all sub-networks can form a consensus, respectively. 
(c) Disjointness: Let ( , )k k kG D E  and ( , )h h hG D E  be any two sub-networks in M , and 
let ( , )kh kh khG D E  be the union of them, where 
kh k hD D D   and 
{( , ) | ( , ) ; , }kh khi j i j i jE d d d d E d d D   . Then, kh
leader
G
D   , i.e., the decision makers in the union 
( , )kh kh khG D E  cannot reach a consensus. 
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(2) Adding edges. In Dong et al. [70], a method to create opinion leader(s) in two 
sub-networks is presented, which is described as Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2 [70]. If an edge e  is added into the union ( , )kh kh khG D E  of sub-networks 
( , )k k kG D E  and ( , )h h hG D E  to obtain ( , )kh kh khG D E , then kh
leader
G
D    if and only if adde E , 
where {( , ) | , } {( , ) | , }k h
add leader h leader k
i j i j e r e rG G
E d d d D d D d d d D d D     . 
Based on Theorem 2, an Adding Edge Algorithm [70] with the time complexity ( )O m  is 
developed to construct the new social network ( , )G D E  in which the decision makers can reach 
a consensus, and min(#( ) #( )) 1
E
E E l   . 
5. Summary, critical discussions and new directions 
Consensus reaching in a SNGDM problem has become a productive research field in recent 
years. Two CRP paradigms (based on trust relationships and opinion evolution) have been 
developed in the SNGDM. 
The CRP paradigm based on trust relationships analyzes the effect of the trust relationships in 
the different aspects of CRPs: incomplete preference values estimation, aggregation, and feedback 
mechanism. The CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution involves two key elements: opinion 
evolution and opinion management. Opinion evolution simulates the interaction among decision 
makers, while opinion management focuses on the design of strategies for facilitating a consensus. 
In the two paradigms, there still exist some limitations that need to be highlighted: 
(1) We can see that the trust relationships, defined by a social network, play an important role 
in CRPs in the SNGDM. In the existing SNGDM CRPs, the trust relationships are assumed to be 
static during the consensus process [8,73-83]. However, in reality the trust relationships between 
decision makers in a social network will change dynamically which obviously can influence the 
consensus process [142]. 
(2) Society and technology trends demand the management of large-scale decision problems 
[61,64,68] on social networks. However, the presented studies of the CRP paradigm based on trust 
relationships rarely relate to large-scale network in the SNGDM. 
(3) The CRPs based on trust relationships [8,73-76,79,80] follow the classical CRP 
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framework, in which IR and DR rules are used to adjust the decision makers’ original opinions to 
increase consensus. However, the existing CRPs based on trust relationships rarely take into 
account the cost of reaching consensus, and also have not analyzed the possibility of reaching 
consensus via the improvement of trust relationships.  
(4) Although opinion evolution has been widely studied and justified, where consensus, 
polarization or fragmentation are the main focus of these studies [11-15,94-100], we argue that the 
CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution in the SNGDM context is still at the early stage, and 
that there are new features still possible to be considered to build a consensus. Particularly, the 
interactions and opinion evolution among decision makers may be complex, emotional, and 
unstable in the real world. 
(5) We find that most SNGDM studies on the two paradigms [11-14,70,73-83] focus on the 
theory and methodology, with few SNGDM studies using real data and tackling practical 
problems. 
Thus, future research on this topic can be developed by considering the following directions:  
(1) Trust relationships, although playing an important role in the CRPs in SNGDM, are 
difficult to obtain in real life. Thus, it is necessary to develop approaches to automate the 
identification of trust relationships among decision makers. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
further develop CRPs in dynamical social network contexts. 
(2) It is necessary to study the large-scale CRP paradigm in SNGDM because many 
large-scale SNGDM problems exist in our real world. Particularly, complex networks (e.g. 
Erdos-Rényi random graph [133], the small-world network [134], and the scale-free network 
[135]) would be a powerful tool to represent the relationships among decision makers.  
(3) Generally, CRPs have associated cost/resource constraints [5,46,49,50]. It will be an 
interesting research direction to develop a CRP model to minimize the cost in social network 
contexts. 
(4) Some decision makers may manipulate the opinions and relationships towards to an 
established purpose [60,61,70,136-138]. It would be interesting to study the manipulation and 
non-cooperative behaviors in SNGDM. 
(5) Although belonging to a different discipline, opinion evolution is increasingly considered 
a tool to model SNGDM problems. Thus, it is necessary to further develop a theoretical basis to 
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build a robust bridge between these different disciplines. 
(6) In SNGDM decision makers will not only use heterogeneous preference representation 
structure [35,39] or different expression domains [31,36, 45,143], but also will measure consensus 
based on individual satisfaction [68]. Thus, it is necessary to develop new SNGDM CRP models 
with the consideration of personalities of decision makers. 
(7) Because most SNGDM studies concentrate on the theory and methodology, it would be 
interesting to investigate and validate the developed SNGDM CRPs with real data to arrive at 
useful real data-driven consensus models to tackle real-world problems. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper reviews the CRPs in the SNGDM context. Firstly, we introduce the CRP 
framework and the basic concepts of social network used in GDM. Secondly, we review the CRP 
paradigm based on trust relationships in which the social relationships are used to estimate 
unknown/missing preference values, as well as in aggregation and feedback mechanism of the 
CRP. Thirdly, we review the CRP paradigm based on opinion evolution in which the opinion 
evolution and opinion management are introduced in detail. Finally, we note some critical 
comments according to the existing studies and suggest new directions to advance this area of 
research.  
Acknowledgments 
We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the grants (Nos. 71571124 and 
71725001) from NSF of China, the grant (No. sksyl201705) from Sichuan University, and the 
grant TIN2016-75850-R supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness 
with FEDER funds. 
References 
[1] W.D. Cook, M. Kress, Ordinal ranking with intensity of preference, Management Science 
31 (1985) 26-32. 
[2] D.S. Hochbaum, A. Levin, Methodologies and algorithms for group-rankings decision, 
Management Science 52 (2006) 1394-1408. 
[3] I. Palomares, F.J. Estrella , L. Martínez, F. Herrera, Consensus under a fuzzy context: 
Taxonomy, analysis framework AFRYCA and experimental case of study, Information 
Fusion 20 (2014) 252-271. 
[4] E. Herrera-Viedma, F.J. Cabrerizo, J. Kacprzyk, W. Pedrycz, A review of soft consensus 
24 
 
models in a fuzzy environment, Information Fusion 17 (2014) 4-13.  
[5] Y.C. Dong, S.H. Zhao, H.J. Zhang, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, A self-management 
mechanism for non-cooperative behaviors in large-scale group consensus reaching 
processes, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, DOI: 10.1109/TFUZZ.2018.2818078. 
[6] F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, J. Verdegay, A sequential selection process in group 
decision making with linguistic assessments, Information Science 85 (1995) 223-239. 
[7] M. Roubens, Fuzzy sets and decision analysis, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 90 (1997) 199-206. 
[8] J. Wu, F. Chiclana, H. Fujita, E. Herrera-Viedma, A visual interaction consensus model for 
social network group decision making with trust propagation, Knowledge-Based Systems 
122 (2017) 39-50. 
[9] S. Alonso, I.J. Pérez, F.J. Cabrerizo, E. Herrera-Viedma, A linguistic consensus model for 
Web 2.0 communities, Applied Soft Computing 13 (2013) 149-157. 
[10] L.G. Pérez, F. Mata, F. Chiclana, G. Kou, E. Herrera-Viedma, Modelling influence in group 
decision making, Soft Computing 20 (2016) 1653-1665.  
[11] N.E. Friedkin, E.C. Johnsen, Social influence and opinion, Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology 15 (1990) 193-205. 
[12] M.H. Degroot, Reaching a consensus, Journal of the American Statistical Association 
69(345) (1974) 118-121. 
[13] R.L. Berger, A necessary and sufficient condition for reaching a consensus using DeGroot's 
model, Journal of the American Statistical Association 76(374) (1981) 415-418. 
[14] R. Hegselmann, U. Krause, Opinion dynamics and bounded confidence models, analysis 
and simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 5(3) (2002). 
[15] Y.C. Dong, M. Zhan, G. Kou, Z.G. Ding, H.M. Liang, A survey on the fusion process in 
opinion dynamics, Information Fusion 43 (2018) 57-65. 
[16] J. Castro, J. Lu, G.Q. Zhang, Y.C. Dong, L. Martínez, Opinion dynamics-based group 
recommender systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems,  
DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.2017.2695158.  
[17] Y.Y. Zhao, L.B. Zhang, M.F. Tang, G. Kou, Bounded confidence opinion dynamics with 
opinion leaders and environmental noises, Computers & Operations Research 74 (2016) 
205-213. 
[18] Y.Y. Zhao, G. Kou, Y. Peng, Y. Chen, Understanding influence power of opinion leaders in 
e-commerce networks: An opinion dynamics theory perspective, Information Sciences 426, 
(2018) 131-147. 
[19] Y.C. Dong, Z.G. Ding, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, Dynamics of public opinions in an 
online and offline social network, IEEE Transactions on Big Data, DOI: 
10.1109/TBDATA.2017.2676810. 
[20] Z.G. Ding, Y.C. Dong, H.M. Liang, F. Chiclana, Asynchronous opinion dynamics with 
online and offline interactions in bounded confidence model, Journal of Artificial 
Societies and Social Simulation 20(4) (2017) 6. 
[21] H.M. Liang, Y.C. Dong, C.C. Li, Dynamics of uncertain opinion formation: An agent-based 
simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 19(4) (2016) 1. 
[22] T. Tanino, On group decision making under fuzzy preferences, in: J. Kacprzyk, M. Fedrizzi 
(Eds.), Multiperson decision making using fuzzy sets and possibility theory, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, (1990) 172-185. 
25 
 
[23] F. Seo, M. Sakawa, Fuzzy multiattribute utility analysis for collective choice, IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 15 (1985) 45-53.  
[24] T. Tanino, Fuzzy preference orderings in group decision making, Fuzzy sets and systems 12 
(1984) 117-131.  
[25] F. Chiclana, F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, Integrating three representation models in fuzzy 
multipurpose decision making based on fuzzy preference relations, Fuzzy sets and Systems 
97(1) (1998) 33-48. 
[26] S.A. Orlovsky, Decision-making with a fuzzy preference relation, Fuzzy sets and Systems 1 
(1978) 155-167. 
[27] S.W. Chen, J. Liu, H. Wang, J.C. Augusto, Ordering based decision making: a survey, 
Information Fusion 14(4) (2013) 521-531. 
[28] F. Herrera, S. Alonso, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, Computing with words in decision 
making: foundations, trends and prospects, Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making 8 
(2009) 337-364. 
[29] F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, Linguistic decision analysis: steps for solving decision 
problems under linguistic information, Fuzzy sets and systems 115 (2000) 67-82. 
[30] L.A. Zadeh, The concept of a linguistic variable and its application to approximate 
reasoning - III, Information Science 9 (1975) 43-80. 
[31] Y.C. Dong, C.C. Li, F. Herrera, Connecting the linguistic hierarchy and the numerical scale 
for the 2-tuple linguistic model and its uses to deal with hesitant unbalanced linguistic 
information, Information Sciences 367-368 (2016) 259-278. 
[32] Y.C. Dong, G.Q. Zhang, W.C. Hong, S. Yu, Linguistic computational model based on 
2-tuples and intervals, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 21 (2013) 1006-1018. 
[33] J. Wallenius, J.S. Dyer, P.C. Fishburn, R.E. Steuer, S. Zionts, K. Deb, Multiple criteria 
decision making, multiattribute utility theory: recent accomplishments and what lies ahead, 
Management Science 54 (2008) 1336-1349. 
[34] Y.C. Dong, H.J. Zhang, E. Herrera-Viedma, Consensus reaching model in the complex and 
dynamic MAGDM problem, Knowledge-Based Systems 106 (2016) 206-219. 
[35] X. Chen, H.J. Zhang, Y.C. Dong, The fusion process with heterogeneous preference 
structures in group decision making: A survey, Information Fusion 24 (2015) 72-83. 
[36] F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, L. Martínez, A fusion approach for managing 
multi-granularity linguistic term sets in decision making, Fuzzy sets and Systems 114 
(2000) 43-58. 
[37] Y.C. Dong, H.J. Zhang, Multiperson decision making with different preference 
representation structures: A direct consensus framework and its properties, 
Knowledge-Based Systems 58 (2014) 45-57. 
[38] W.Q. Liu, Y.C. Dong, F. Chiclana, F.J. Cabrerizo, E. Herrera-Viedma, Group 
decision-making based on heterogeneous preference relations with self-confidence, Fuzzy 
Optimization and Decision Making 16 (2017) 429-447. 
[39] E. Herrera-Viedma, F. Herrera, F. Chiclana, A consensus model for multiperson decision 
making with different preference structures, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans 32(3) (2002) 394-402. 
[40] L.G. Pérez, F. Mata, F. Chiclana, Social network decision making with linguistic 
trustworthiness-based induced OWA operators, International Journal of Intelligent 
26 
 
Systems 29(12) (2014) 1117-1137.  
[41] R.R. Yager, On ordered weighted averaging aggregation operators in multicriteria decision 
making, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 18 (1988) 183-190. 
[42] F. Chiclana, J.M. Tapia Garcia, M.J. del Moral, E. Herrera-Viedma, A statistical 
comparative study of different similarity measures of consensus in group decision making, 
Information Sciences 221 (2013) 110-23. 
[43] T. González-Arteaga, R. De Andrés Calle, F. Chiclana, A new measure of consensus with 
fuzzy preference relations: The correlation consensus degree, Knowledge-Based Systems 
107 (2016) 104-16.  
[44] F.J. Cabrerizo, J.M. Moreno, I.J. Pérez, E. Herrera-Viedma, Analyzing consensus 
approaches in fuzzy group decision making: advantages and drawbacks, Soft Computing 
14 (2010) 451-463. 
[45] E. Herrera-Viedma, L. Martínez, F. Mata, F. Chiclana, A consensus support system model 
for group decision-making problems with multigranular linguistic preference relations, 
IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 13 (2005) 644-658. 
[46] D. Ben-Arieh, T. Easton, B. Evans, Minimum cost consensus with quadratic cost functions, 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans 39 
(2009) 210-217. 
[47] Y.C. Dong, Y.F. Xu, H.Y. Li, B. Feng, The OWA-based consensus operator under linguistic 
representation models using position indexes, European Journal of Operational Research 
203 (2010) 455-463.  
[48] Y.C. Dong, C.C. Li, Y.F. Xu, X. Gu, Consensus-based group decision making under 
multi-granular unbalanced 2-tuple linguistic preference relations, Group Decision and 
Negotiation 24 (2015) 217-242. 
[49] G.Q. Zhang, Y.C. Dong, Y.F. Xu, H.Y. Li, Minimum cost consensus models under 
aggregation operators, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A 41 
(2011) 1253-1261.   
[50] Y.C. Dong, X. Chen, F. Herrera, Minimizing adjusted simple terms in the consensus 
reaching process with hesitant linguistic assessments in group decision making, 
Information Sciences 297 (2015) 95-117.  
[51] F. Chiclana, F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, Integrating multiplicative preference relations 
in a multipurpose decision-making model based on fuzzy preference relations, Fuzzy Sets 
and Systems 122 (2001) 277-291.  
[52] F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, Choice functions and mechanisms for linguistic preference 
relations, European Journal of Operational Research 120(1) (2000) 144-161.  
[53] G.H. Wen, W.W. Yu, Z.K. Li, X.H. Yu, J.D. Cao, Neuro-Adaptive consensus tracking of 
multiagent systems with a high-dimensional leader, IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics 
47(7) (2017) 1730-1742.    
[54] Z.W. Gong, X.X. Xu, F.L. Lu, L.S. Li, C. Xu, On consensus models with utility preferences 
and limited budget, Applied Soft Computing 35 (2015) 840-849.  
[55] D. Guha, D. Chakraborty, Fuzzy multi attribute group decision making method to achieve 
consensus under the consideration of degrees of confidence of experts' opinions, 
Computers & Industrial Engineering 60 (2011) 493-504.  
[56] Z.B. Wu, J.P. Xu, Possibility distribution-based approach for MAGDM with hesitant fuzzy 
27 
 
linguistic information, IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics 46 (2016) 694-705. 
[57] R.O. Parreiras, P.Ya. Ekel, D.C. Morais, Fuzzy set based consensus schemes for 
multicriteria group decision making applied to strategic planning, Group Decision and 
Negotiation 21 (2012) 153-183. 
[58] H.J. Zhang, Y.C. Dong, X. Chen, The 2-rank consensus reaching model in the 
multi-granular linguistic multiple attribute group decision making. IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.2017.2694429. 
[59] S.H. Kim, S.H. Choi, J.K. Kim, An interactive procedure for multiple attribute group 
decision making with incomplete information: Range-based approach, European Journal 
of Operational Research 118 (1999) 139-152.  
[60] Y.C. Dong, H.J. Zhang, E. Herrera-Viedma, Integrating experts' weights generated 
dynamically into the consensus reaching process and its applications in managing 
non-cooperative behaviors, Decision Support Systems 84 (2016) 1-15. 
[61] I. Palomares, L. Martínez, F. Herrera, A consensus model to detect and manage 
noncooperative behaviors in large-scale group decision making, IEEE Transactions on 
Fuzzy Systems 22(3) (2014) 516-529. 
[62] J. Kacprzyk & S. Zadrozny, Soft computing and Web intelligence for supporting consensus 
reaching, Soft Computing 14 (2010) 833-846. 
[63] I.J. Pérez, F.J. Cabrerizo, S. Alonso, Enrique Herrera-Viedma, A new consensus model for 
group decision making problems with non-homogeneous experts, IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems 44(4) (2014) 494-498. 
[64] F.J. Quesada, I. Palomares, L. Martínez, Managing experts behavior in large-scale 
consensus reaching processes with uninorm aggregation operators, Applied Soft 
Computing 35 (2015) 873-887.  
[65] G.Q. Zhang, Y.C. Dong, Y.F. Xu, Consistency and consensus measures for linguistic 
preference relations based on distribution assessments, Information Fusion 17 (2014) 
46-55.  
[66] F.J. Cabrerizo, I.J. Pérez, E. Herrera-Viedma, Managing the consensus in group decision 
making in an unbalanced fuzzy linguistic context with incomplete information, 
Knowledge-Based Systems 23 (2010) 169-181.  
[67] F. Mata, L. Martínez, E. Herrera-Viedma, An adaptive consensus support model for group 
decision-making problems in a multigranular fuzzy linguistic context, IEEE Transactions 
on Fuzzy Systems 17(2) (2009) 279-290.  
[68] H.J. Zhang, Y.C. Dong, E. Herrera-Viedma, Consensus building for the heterogeneous 
large-scale GDM with the individual concerns and satisfactions, IEEE Transactions on 
Fuzzy Systems 26 (2018) 884-898.  
[69] A.K. Choudhury, R. Shankar, M.K. Tiwari, Consensus-based intelligent group 
decision-making model for the selection of advanced technology, Decision Support 
Systems 42 (2006) 1776-1799.  
[70] Y.C. Dong, Z.G. Ding, L. Martínez, F. Herrera, Managing consensus based on leadership in 
opinion dynamics, Information Sciences 397-398 (2017) 187-205. 
[71] S. Wasserman, K. Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 8, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.  
[72] P. Victor, C. Cornelis, M. De Cock, E. Herrera-Viedma, Practical aggregation operators for 
28 
 
gradual trust and distrust, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 184 (2011) 126-147.  
[73] J. Wu, R.Y. Xiong, F. Chiclana, Uninorm trust propagation and aggregation methods for 
group decision making in social network with four tuple information, Knowledge-Based 
Systems 96 (2016) 29-39. 
[74] Q. Liang, X.W. Liao, J.P. Liu, A social ties-based approach for group decision-making 
problems with incomplete additive preference relations, Knowledge-Based Systems 119 
(2017) 68-86. 
[75] J. Wu, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, Trust based consensus model for social network in 
an incomplete linguistic information context, Applied Soft Computing 35 (2015) 827-839.  
[76] M. Gupta, Consensus building process in group decision making - an adaptive procedure 
based on group dynamics, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, DOI: 
10.1109/TFUZZ.2017.2755581. 
[77] X.H. Xu, B. Wang, Y.J Zhou, A method based on trust model for large group 
decision-making with incomplete preference information, Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy 
Systems 30 (2016) 3551-3565. 
[78] J.F Chu, X.W. Liu, Y.M. Wang, Social network analysis based approach to group decision 
making problem with fuzzy preference relations, Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems 
31 (2016) 1271-1285. 
[79] Y.J. Liu, C.Y. Liang, F. Chiclana, J. Wu, A trust induced recommendation mechanism for 
reaching consensus in group decision making, Knowledge-Based Systems 119 (2017) 
221-231. 
[80] J. Wu, F. Chiclana, A social network analysis trust-consensus based approach to group 
decision-making problems with interval-valued fuzzy reciprocal preference relations, 
Knowledge-Based Systems 59 (2014) 97-107. 
[81] N. Capuano, F. Chiclana, H. Fujita, E. Herrera-Viedma, V. Loia, Fuzzy group decision 
making with incomplete information guided by social influence, IEEE Transactions on 
Fuzzy Systems 26(3) (2018) 1704-1718. 
[82] J. Wu, L.F. Dai, F. Chiclana, H. Fujita, E. Herrera-Viedma, A minimum adjustment cost 
feedback mechanism based consensus model for group decision making under social 
network with distributed linguistic trust, Information Fusion 41 (2017) 232-242. 
[83] N.H. Kamis, F. Chiclana, J. Levesley, Preference similarity network structural equivalence 
clustering based consensus group decision making model, Applied Soft Computing 67 
(2018) 706-720. 
[84] F. Chiclana, F. Mata, S. Alonso, E. Herrera-Viedma, L. Martínez, Integration of a 
consistency control module within a consensus decision making model, International 
Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 16 (2008) 35-53.  
[85] F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, S. Alonso, F. Herrera, Cardinal consistency of reciprocal 
preference relations: a characterization of multiplicative transitivity, IEEE Transactions on 
Fuzzy Systems 17(1) (2009) 14-23. 
[86] C. Porcel, E. Herrera-Viedma, Dealing with incomplete information in a fuzzy linguistic 
recommender system to disseminate information in university digital libraries, 
Knowledge-Based Systems 23 (2010) 32-39. 
[87] S. Alonso, F. Chiclana, F. Herrera, E. Herrera-Viedma, J. Alcala-Fdez, C. Porcel, A 
consistency-based procedure to estimate missing pairwise preference values, International 
29 
 
Journal Intelligent Systems 23(2) (2008) 155-175. 
[88] G. Mckeown, N. Sheehy, Mass media and polarisation processes in the bounded confidence 
model of opinion dynamics, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9(1) 
(2006) 1460-7425. 
[89] R. Hegselmann, Stefan König, S. Kurz, C. Niemann, J. Rambau, Opitimal opinion control: 
the campaign problem, 2015. 
[90] H. Han, C. Qiang, C. Wang, H. Jing, Soft-control for collective opinion of weighted 
DeGroot model, Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 30(3) (2017) 550-567. 
[91] K. Lehere, When rational disagreement is impossible, Noȗs 10(3) (1976) 327-332.  
[92] K. Lehere, Social consensus and rational agnoiology, Synthese 31 (1975) 141-160. 
[93] K. Lehere, Consensus and comparison: A theory of social rationality, Foundations and 
Applications of Decision Theory 13 (1978) 283-309. 
[94] N.E. Friedkin, E.C. Johnsen, Social Influence Networks and Opinion Change, Advances in 
Group Processes 16(1) (1999) 1-29.  
[95] J.C. Dittmer, Consensus formation under bounded confidence, Nonlinear analysis 47 (2001) 
4615-4621. 
[96] G. Deffuant, Comparing extremism propagation patterns in continuous opinion models, 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9(3) (2006) 1460-7425. 
[97] O. AskariSichani, M. Jalili, Influence maximization of informed agents in social networks, 
Applied Mathematics and Computation 254 (2015) 229-239.  
[98] E. Kurmyshev, H.A. Juárez, R.A. González-Silva, Dynamics of bounded confidence 
opinion in heterogeneous social networks: Concord against partial antagonism, Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 390(16) (2011) 2945-2955.  
[99] D. Stauffer, H. Meyer-Ortmanns, Simulation of consensus model of Deffuant et al. on a 
Barabási-Albert network, International Journal of Modern Physics C 15(2) (2004) 
241-246.  
[100] G. Weisbuch, Bounded confidence and social networks, The European Physical Journal B 
38(2) (2004) 339-343. 
[101] M. Jalili, Social power and opinion formation in complex networks, Physica A: Statistical 
mechanics and its applications 392(4) (2013) 959-966. 
[102] W. Quattrociocchi, G. Caldarelli, A. Scala, Opinion dynamics on interacting networks: 
media competition and social influence, Scientific Reports 4(21) (2014) 4938. 
[103] G. Deffuant, D. Neau, F. Amblard, G. Weisbuch, Mixing beliefs among interacting agents, 
Advances in Complex Systems 3(1) (2000) 87-98. 
[104] S. Fortunato, Damage spreading and opinion dynamics on scale-free networks, Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 348 (2005) 683-690.  
[105] K.J.S. Zollman, Social network structure and the achievement of consensus, Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics 11(1) (2012) 26-44.  
[106] J.E. Cohen, J. Hajnal, C.M. Newman, Approaching consensus can be delicate when 
positions harden, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 22 (1986) 315-322. 
[107] L. Frachebourg, P.L. Krapivsky, Exact results for kinetics of catalytic reactions, Physical 
Review E 53(4) (1995) R3009-R3012.  
[108] C.M. Schneider-Mizell, L.M. Sander, A generalized voter model on complex 
networks, Journal of Statistical Physics 136(1) (2009) 59-71.  
30 
 
[109] R.A. Holley, T.M. Liggett, Ergodic theorems for weakly interacting infinite systems and the 
voter model, The annals of probability 3(4) (1975) 643-663.  
[110] R. Basu, A. Sly, Evolving voter model on dense random graphs, The Annals of Applied 
Probability 27(2) (2017) 1235-1288.  
[111] C. Castellano, M. Marsili., A. Vespignani, Nonequilibrium phase transition in a model for 
social influence, Physical Review Letters 85(16) (2000) 3536-3539.  
[112] C. Castellano, D. Vilone, A. Vespignani, Incomplete ordering of the voter model on 
small-world networks, Europhysics Letters 63(1) (2003) 153-158.  
[113] V. Sood, S. Redner, Voter model on heterogeneous graphs, Physical Review Letters, 94(17) 
(2005) 178701. 
[114] M. Diakonova, V. Nicosia, V. Latora, M.S. Miguel, Irreducibility of multilayer network 
dynamics: the case of the voter model, New Journal of Physics 18(1) (2016) 114-120. 
[115] P. Chen, S. Redner, Majority rule dynamics in finite dimensions, Physical Review E 71 
(2005) 036101.  
[116] R. Lambiotte, Majority rule on heterogeneous networks, Journal of Physics A: 
Mathematical and Theoretical, 41 (2008) 224021.  
[117] N. Lanchier, J. Neufer, Stochastic dynamics on hypergraphs and the spatial majority rule 
model, Journal of Statistical Physics 151 (2013) 21-45.  
[118] D. Stauffer, Sociophysics: the Sznajd model and its applications, Computer physics 
communications 146(1) (2002) 93-98.  
[119] F.A. Rodrigues, L. da F. Costa, Surviving opinions in Sznajd models on complex networks, 
International Journal of Modern Physics C 16(11) (2005) 1785-1792. 
[120] A.S. Elgazzar, Application of the Sznajd sociophysics model to small-world networks, 
International Journal of Modern Physics C 12(10) (2001) 1537-1544. 
[121] A.T. Bernardes, D. Stauffer, J. Kertesz, Election results and the Sznajd model on Barabasi 
network, The European Physical Journal B 25(1) (2002) 123-127.  
[122] J. Han, M. Li, L. Guo, Soft control on collective behavior of a group of autonomous agents 
by a shill agent, Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 19(1) (2006) 54-62. 
[123] H. Han, C. Qiang, C. Wang, J. Han, Intervention of DeGroot model by soft control, 
Proceedings of the 34th Chinese Control Conference, 1291-1296, 2015. 
[124] S. Kurz, Optimal control of the freezing time in the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics, Journal 
of Difference Equations and Applications 21(8) (2015) 633-648. 
[125] Z.G. Ding, H.M. Liang, Y.C. Dong, F. Chialana, E. Herrera-Viedma, F.J. Cabrerizo, An 
opinion control rule with minimum adjustments to support the consensus reaching in 
bounded confidence model, Procedia Computer Science 91 (2016) 617-624. 
[126] M. Afshar, M. Asadpour, Opinion formation by informed agents, Journal of Artificial 
Societies and Social Simulation 13(4) (2010). 
[127] K. Fan, W. Pedrycz, Opinion evolution influenced by informed agents, Physica A: 
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 462 (2016) 431-441. 
[128] N. Crokidakis, Effects of mass media on opinion spreading in the Sznajd sociophysics 
model, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 391(4) (2012) 1729-1734. 
[129] Y. Wu, S. Liu, K. Yan, M. Liu, F. Wu, Opinion flow: visual analysis of opinion diffusion on 




[130] M. Pineda, G.M. Buendía, Mass media and heterogeneous bounds of confidence in 
continuous opinion dynamics, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 420 
(2015) 73-84.  
[131] F. Colaiori, C. Castellano, Interplay between media and social influence in the collective 
behavior of opinion dynamics, Physical Review E 92(4) (2015) 042815.  
[132] C. Schulze, Advertising in the Sznajd marketing model, International Journal of Modern 
Physics C 14(1) (2003) 95. 
[133] P. Erdős, A. Rényi, On the evolution of random graphs, Publications of the Mathematical 
Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 5 (1) (1960) 17-60.  
[134] M.E.J. Newman, D.J. Watts, Renormalization group analysis of the small-world network 
model, Physics Letters A 263(4) (1999) 341-346. 
[135] A.L. Barabasi, R. Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks, Science 286(5439) 
(1999) 509-512.  
[136] R.R. Yager, Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent 
decision making, European Journal of Operational Research 141 (2002) 217-232. 
[137] R.R. Yager, Penalizing strategic preference manipulation in multi-agent decision making, 
IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 9 (2001) 393-403. 
[138] Y.C. Dong, Y.T. Liu, H.M. Liang, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, Strategic weight 
manipulation in multiple attribute decision making, Omega 75 (2018) 154-164. 
[139] J.R. French, R.P. John, A formal theory of social power, Psychological Review 63(3) (1956) 
181-194.  
[140] E. Herrera-Viedma, F.J. Cabrerizo, F. Chiclana, J. Wu, M.J. Cobo, K. Samuylov, Consensus 
in group decision making and social networks, Studies in Informatics and Control 26(3) 
(2017) 259-268.  
[141] Y. Cao, W. Yu, W. Ren, G. Chen, An overview of recent progress in the study of distributed 
multi-agent coordination, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 9 (2013) 427-438. 
[142] I.J. Pérez, F.J. Cabrerizo, S. Alonso, Y.C. Dong, F. Chiclana, E. Herrera-Viedma, On 
dynamic consensus processes in group decision making problems, Information Sciences 
459 (2018) 20–35. 
[143] F.J. Cabrerizo, R. Al-Hmouz, A. Morfeq, A.S. Balamash, M.A. Martínez, E. 
Herrera-Viedma, Soft consensus measures in group decision making using unbalanced 




Click here to download LaTeX Source Files: revised review on sngdm.doc
